The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has requested the U.S. Supreme Court to rule that it is not bound by federal antidiscrimination laws, including Title IX, simply because it consists of educational institutions that receive federal funds. The NCAA has broad powers granted by its member colleges and universities to establish and enforce eligibility rules for student participation in intercollegiate athletics. Due to its control over eligibility determinations, the Clinton administration argues that the NCAA is most responsible for any discriminatory actions. The case in question involves Renee M. Smith, a former college volleyball player, who sued the association after being denied a waiver that would have allowed her to play intercollegiate volleyball at two universities while pursuing her graduate studies.

Ms. Smith had already played on the volleyball team at St. Bonaventure University for two years before completing her bachelor’s degree in a shortened time frame. As a graduate student, she sought to utilize her remaining athletic eligibility to join their volleyball teams.

Ms. Smith’s lawsuit alleges that the NCAA grants a disproportionate number of waivers to men, allowing them to compete at different institutions. She brings her case under Title IX, which prohibits gender-based discrimination in educational programs that receive federal funding. Initially, a federal district court dismissed the lawsuit, stating that it did not demonstrate a violation of Title IX since Ms. Smith did not claim that the NCAA was a recipient of federal aid. However, upon discovering that the association operates the National Youth Sports Program, which directly receives federal funding for summer programs on college campuses, Ms. Smith sought to amend her lawsuit, but her request was denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit later reversed the district court’s decision, ruling that Ms. Smith should have been allowed to amend her suit. The court concluded that the NCAA’s receipt of dues from member institutions that receive federal funds puts it within the scope of Title IX.

The NCAA has appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that it is only indirectly benefitting from federal financial assistance and, therefore, should not fall under the jurisdiction of Title IX. The association’s lawyer, John G. Roberts Jr., asserts that simply tracing the money is insufficient and maintaining such a theory would subject nearly every education association made up of schools or colleges that receive federal aid to Title IX and other anti-discrimination laws. The Clinton administration supports Ms. Smith’s right to sue but believes the 3rd Circuit court used an incorrect analysis to conclude that the association is subject to Title IX solely because it receives dues from colleges. They argue that Title IX should also apply to any entity to which a recipient has delegated controlling authority over a program. Some justices appear open to this argument, as well as the idea that the NCAA may be subject to Title IX due to its affiliation with the National Youth Sports Program. However, they express concern that these arguments were not fully explored in the lower courts. The implications of this case for K-12 education remain unclear, as if the high court adopts the theory that an association delegated authority over a program is subject to federal laws like Title IX, high school athletic governing bodies could potentially fall under the same umbrella as the NCAA.

In a friend-of-the-court brief, groups that have previously opposed the NCAA over its high school course requirements for college-athlete eligibility raise the issue that the association should also be subject to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. This act prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals in programs that receive federal funds.

Additionally, in an unrelated matter, the text mentions "Kentucky Testing." However, no further information or context is provided.

The legal case in question is Triplett v. Livingston County Board of Education (No. 98-760).